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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Deere Plow Co. v. Mowry, 222 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915), it was.
held that "it is only to a settled rule of a State Court applicable to the
precise facts disclosed by the record that Federal Court should yield
its own judgment."
The weight of the authority seems to be that where there has
not been a final adjudication by the highest court of State the Federal
Courts will make their own rule and are bound thereby. Dernberger
v. B. & 0. R. R., 243 Fed. 21, (C. C. A. 4th, 1917); U. S.
v. Cargel, 263 Fed. 856, (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) ; John Deere Plow Co. v.
Mowry supra, Karch Co. v. Adams, 231 Fed. 950, (C. C. A. 6th,
1916).
Better Rule would seem to be that in construing a State Statute
the Federal Courts should for sake of harmony lean to agreement
with State Court. Pineland Club v. Roberts, 213 Fed. 545, (C. C. A.
4th, 1914); Holden v. Circleville Light & Power Co., 216 Fed. 490,
(C. C. A. 6th, 1914).
CRIMINAL LAw-HoMICIDE--INTOXICATION AS A DEFENSE-The de-
fendant was charged, in the indictment and on the trial was convicted,
of killing one Mahaira while engaged in the commission of a felony,
to wit, the crime of robbery, upon the person killed. Evidence as
to the defendant's intoxication was adduced as a defense and the
court charged that the defendant could he convicted of first degree
murder or acquitted. An appeal is brought on a refusal to charge as
to the different degrees of homicide. Held, that since a conviction of
homicide was dependent upon specific intent, it was error to refuse
the charge as to intoxication. Judgment reversed and new trial
granted, three judges dissenting, the dissenting opinion is apparently
based on the conclusiori that no intoxication was shown by the evi-
dence and that therefore the conviction should be affirmed. People
v. Koerber, 244 N. Y. 147, 155 N. E. 97 (1926).
Voluntary intoxication has not always been considered a defense
in a criminal prosecution "He who is guilty of any crime whatever,
through his voluntary drunkenness, shall be punished for it as much as
if he had been sober." 1 Hawk. P. C. ch. 1 par. 6. In fact, some old
decisions, no longer law, hold that voluntary drunkenness is an aggrava-
tion of the crime; Beverly's Case, 4 Coke 123 B. 125 A; 4 Black. Com-
?5; State v. Thompson, Wright (Ohio) 617 (1834). This rule was
apparently based on the theory that voluntary intoxication is, in
itself, a wrongful act, for the immediate consequences of which the
law will hold the party liable. Lew U. S. Crim. Law 405; O'Herrin v.
State, 14 Ind. 420 (1860). But settled insanity produced by habitual
intoxication is a defense to crime to the same extent as insanity pro-
duced by other causes. State v. Potts, 100 N. C. 457, 6 S. E. 657
(1888); State v. Kavanaugh, 4 Pen. (Del.) 131, 53 Atl. 335 (1902).
The modem rule of intoxication, in New York, has been embodied
in the Penal Code, sec. 1220, which provides substantially that no
criminal act shall be excused by reason of voluntary intoxication.
But, wherever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive,
or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or
degree of crime, the jury may take in to consideration the fact that
the accused was intoxicated at the time, in determining the purpose,
motive or intent with which he .committed the act. This statute has
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been interpreted to mean that whenever the intoxication of a defend-
ant arises upon the evidence in a trial for murder, the jury should
say whether such intoxication prevented the intent, premeditation and
deliberation essential to constitute the crime and failure to so instruct
is error although no request to so charge is made on the defendant's
behalf. People v. VanZandt, 224 N. Y. 354, 120 N. E. 725 (1918);
People v. Leonardi, 143 N. Y. 360, 38 N. E. 322 (1894). This rule
applies not only to total, but to partial intoxication also. People v.
Gerdvine, 210 N. Y. 184, 104 N. E. 129 (1914). But where a person,
after previously determining to commit a homicide, voluntarily drinks
himself into a state of intoxication, it is no defense under the Code.
People' v. Koerner, 191 N. Y. 528, 84 N. E. 1117 (1908); State V.
Shelton, 164 N. C. 513, 79 S. E. 883 (1913).
PARENT AND CHILD--NEGLIGENcE-An action brought by an in-
fant, his mother as guardian ad litem, against his father, defehdant,
to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident
by reason of the defendant's negligence. Held, the suit could not be
maintained inasmuch as a child under the age of 14 could not recover
damages against the parent on the above stated facts. Judgment
reversed and cause remanded with instructions to sustain demurrers.
Wick v. Wick, 212 N. W. 787 (Wisc. 1927).
Inasmuch as there are no English cases as a precedent the infer-
ence may be drawn that such action was not maintainable at common
law. Up to the year of 1891, this issue was not decided by an
appellate court until the case of Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9
So. 885 (1891), wherein it was held that the action was untenable.
Following this adjudication, many states have based their decisions,
most consistently and in surprising judicial harmony. McKelvey v.
McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37
Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247,
114 N. W. 763 (1908); Small v. Morrison, 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E.
12 (1923); Smith v. Smith, 81 Ind. Rep. 566, 142 N. E. 128 (1924);
Materese v. Materese, 47 R. I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Mannion v.
Mannion, 3 N. J. Misc. 68, 129 At. 431 (1925). In support of this
doctrine, the reasons advanced are on the ground of public policy.
The family consists of a unit of sanctity, wherein the strongest natural
ties bind all of its members to mutual love, interest and welfare. For
to question parental authority encourages the impairment and under-
mining of the wholesome influence of the home. ' The disruption of the
fireside's peacefulness and stability is the proximate result. However,
-where one staxiding in loco parentis is guilty of excessively punish-
ing a child, he is liable for damages. Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366,
206 N. W. 173 (1925).
In the able dissent of Crownhart, J., it is pointed out that the
Constitution of Wisconsin, Art. I, Sect. 9, provides for the relief of
any person for injuries received to his person, property or character.
As to a principle of common law, the maxim is "there is no wrong
without a remedy." Especially well stressed- is this forceful argu-
ment. Why is a cause of action by an infant against his parent
tenable for a debt due or for an accounting of trust funds or for the
